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ADMINISTERING JUSTICE IN A CONSENSUS-
BASED SOCIETY 
Koichiro Fujikura* 
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARA-
DOX. By John 0. Haley. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. 
Pp. x, 258. $39.95. 
I 
In Authority Without Power, 1 Professor John Haley2 attempts to 
explain significant Japanese paradoxes: 
Japan is notable as a society with both extraordinary institutional con-
tinuity along with institutional change; of cohesion with conflict, hierar-
chy with equality, cooperation with competition, and above all else a 
manifest prevalence of community control with an equally strong im-
pulse toward independence and autonomy .... It is a nation where polit-
ical rule appears strong but also weak; governance centralized but also 
diffused; the individual subservient but also achieving; the social order 
closed but also open. [p. 4] 
Professor Haley develops a thesis that Japan's society and its legal 
system is one of "authority without power" and "law without sanc-
tions." His pairing of these words, usually understood as almost sy-
nonymous in the Western legal and political lexicon, serves as the key 
for his analysis of the Japanese legal system. The author has suc-
ceeded in constructing a theoretical package to explain those para-
doxes of Japanese law and society often puzzling to Western observers, 
and in doing so he presents a plausible overall picture of the Japanese 
legal system. To provide a general account and analysis of any legal 
system is a formidable intellectual undertaking, but Haley's picture of 
Japan's legal system should be quite persuasive to Western readers, 
and it is certainly fascinating to Japanese readers. 
Professor Haley argues that, by the mid-nineteenth century, Japa-
nese society had well-established institutions and processes for three 
basic paradigms of societal control: "[first] the administrative 
• Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo. Bach. of Law 1957, Doshisha University 
(Japan); B.A. 1961, Amherst College; LL.M. 1962, Northwestern; LL.M. 1963, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. This review reflects views expressed by participants in a minisymposium on Professor 
Haley's book held on December 16, 1992, at the University of Tokyo. I am especially indebted to 
comments made by members of a Western panel: Professor Richard Minear of the University of 
Massachusetts, Professor Mark Ramseyer of the University of Chicago Law School, and Profes-
sor Malcolm Smith of the University of Melbourne Law School. 
2. Professor of Law and of Asian Studies and Director of the Asian Law Program at the 
University of Washington. 
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processes of a centralized bureaucratic state, [second] the adjudicatory 
institutions for a system of judicial governance, and [third] arrange-
ments of indirect governance based predominantly on community-
based consensual or contractual patterns of social control exemplified 
by the rural mura or village" (p. 18). 
Some legal historians are certain to dispute the relevance of 
Haley's paradigms and interpretations. Nevertheless, many Japanese 
legal scholars may find his bold attempt revealing, for they generally 
perceive Japan's contemporary law and legal institutions as the prod-
uct of a wholesale adoption of Western legal systems since the Meiji 
Restoration, a time when Japan apparently made a clean break from 
its own legal traditions and institutions. 3 Haley's paradigms may also 
be revealing for those who still labor under the popular assumption in 
the United States that no such thing as "law" exists in Japan. 
Haley depicts three paradigms that effectively challenge these ele-
mentary assumptions about Japanese law and society. His contribu-
tion and the book's strength can be found in the first part, in which he 
provides, using bold strokes and drawing from existing works, a con-
cise description of Japanese legal history from the seventh century on 
and develops his dynamic for understanding Japanese law and soci-
ety. 4 He is less successful, however, in applying this dynamic to his 
carefully chosen contemporary subject areas in the book's second 
part. 5 His paradigms, apparently serving their intended purposes, 
often prove troublesome and unsatisfactory in analyzing the role of 
law in contemporary Japanese society. In concrete cases, Haley's par-
adigms seem to prove too much or too little and seem to invoke more 
than dispel untested assumptions. 
Before discussing the three interrelated paradigms and the 
3. What is the real importance of the old Japanese law to the modern law of Japan? As 
will be seen, the modern state law has no connection with the former Japanese law. The 
modern law considers itself rather as an heir of Western law •... It could therefore be said 
that the history of Japanese law is, for the present at least, a luxury. 
YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 39 (Anthony N. Angelo trans. & ed., 
1976). 
4. Other recent and concise works in English on Japanese legal history include: RvosUKE 
ISHII, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (1980); CARL STEENSTRUP, A HIS-
TORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 (1991). 
S. The book consists of two parts. Part I is captioned "Continuity with Change: The Histor-
ical Foundations of Governance and Legal Control in Japan" (p. 17) and includes historical 
accounts and an analysis of the development of the Japanese legal system from the seventh cen-
tury A.D., when Japan began selectively adopting aspects of China's legal system, to the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868, when Japan, in an apparent abandonment of its traditional system, began 
adopting features of the civil law systems of continental Europe, drawing primarily from German 
and French codes. 
Part II is entitled "Cohesion with Conflict: The Containment of Legal Controls" (p. 81) and 
deals with four carefully selected aspects of the contemporary Japanese legal system: "Lawsuits 
and Lawyers: The Making of a Myth" (ch. 5); "Policemen and Prosecutors: Crime without 
Punishment" (ch. 6); "Bureaucrats and Business: Administrative Power Constrained" (ch. 7); 
and "Hamlets and Hoodlums: The Social Impact of Law without Sanctions" (ch. 8). 
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problems they pose in their application, one must first examine some 
critical principles that the reader must apply to assess a book of this 
nature - a book in which the author, from a comparative perspective, 
tries to construct a general theory for understanding a foreign legal 
culture within the context of the society's history, culture, and 
ideology. 
First, any effort to build an overarching, general theoretical frame-
work to explain another society and its law, especially Japan, though 
inspiring and stimulating, is suspect and bound to produce distortions 
and myths. In developing paradigms in the historical context, one 
must always ask critical questions such as what the connection is be-
tween history and contemporary Japan and how direct an influence 
one can see, for example, between a pre-World War I Japanese village 
and a modem Japanese village. Without establishing a reasonable 
connection between historical facts and contemporary problems, any 
general theory tends to produce loose and slippery interpretations. 
Second, one faces an evident risk in relying on excessive contrasts 
and overstatements in any two-sided comparison, especially between 
Japan and the United States. Any finding of inscrutable nature in one 
society may reflect extremity in the other. Haley, aware of this risk, 
tries to broaden his comparisons by referring to Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Korea as much as possible.6 Despite the author's ca-
veat,7 however, the book overemphasizes distinctions and peculiarities, 
rather than similarities and common elements, of Japanese law and 
legal institutions that reflect opposite characteristics from those found 
in American law and legal institutions. 
Third, the author often relies heavily upon cultural explanations. 
Granted that "legal systems are themselves self-defining, cultural be-
lief systems" (p. 4) and cultural explanations are useful in developing a 
general understanding of the Japanese legal system, cultural explana-
tions are difficult to substantiate or disprove. Analyzing cultural dif-
ferences in terms of rational human behavior and the various 
institutional constraints affecting individual decisionmaking may 
prove more productive. 
6. The author's intention is indeed ambitious and goes beyond a simple two-sided 
comparison. 
As a study of a legal order in a specific context, this book is intended to expand understand-
ing of the function and limits oflaw in society. Japan's legal order thus becomes the focus 
for a broader exploration of the interrelationships of law, social order, and change .... The 
purpose of this book therefore is twofold: to use Japan as a window to law and law as a 
window to Japan. 
P.4. 
7. At the outset, however, it is important for the reader to appreciate the stark contrast 
with the United States and to guard against a common fallacy of viewing Japan from a 
totally American perspective. Differences do exist but the United States has no greater 
claim as model or standard for comparison than Japan. Both societies represent extremes of 
a kind. Neither reflects the norm, if indeed any norm does exist. 
P. 14. One might ask: "If no norm exists, how could there be paradox?" 
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According to Haley, the historical development of Japan's legal 
system can be divided into two broadly defined periods. "Each fea-
tures an abrupt infusion of foreign ideas and institutions followed by a 
gradual process of indigenous adaptation" (p. 17). The first period, 
during which Japan developed what the author calls an "ambivalent 
tradition" (p. 17), is "characterized by the tensions between the ideas 
and institutions derived from early imperial Chinese law and those 
forged by native Japanese political and social forces" (p. 17). The sec-
ond period is characterized as a period of "[r]eception, adaptation, and 
containment of Western law" (p. 18), starting with the French and the 
German codes and legal institutions soon after the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868. During this second period, "Japan experienced the institu-
tional transformation of its legal order into a modern, predominately 
German-derivative, civil law system as well as the adaptation and ulti-
mate containment of Western legal institutions during the first half of 
this century ... " (p. 18). The author maintains that "[t]he process 
continued in postwar Japan, commencing with military occupation 
and the imposition of American-inspired constitutional and regulatory 
reforms" (p. 18). 
Haley develops his three paradigms against the backdrop of these 
two broadly defined periods. The first paradigm is that of the adminis-
trative state with pervasive authority but with little coercive power, in 
which law was public, serving as an instrument of the state, and de-
void of moral authority (pp. 19-32). Japan adopted this administrative 
state tradition from China in its first reception of foreign law during 
the seventh century. Japan borrowed both the concept of the state as a 
political unit, with authority to rule vested in an imperial institution, 
and methods of centralized bureaucratic governance. The imperial 
rulers wielded enormous authority, but this authority did not carry a 
consummate degree of state power; state authority tended to be much 
broader than state coercive power. Also, in the Chinese tradition, law 
and morality were essentially separated; laws were not, in and of them-
selves, moral commands. Private law, in the Western sense, was not 
developed. 
Borrowing selectively from this Chinese system, Japan instituted 
land tenure, taxation, penal codes, and other administrative regula-
tions and procedures. Moreover, Japan began to develop indigenous 
legal institutions. Beginning with the Kamakura bakufu (literally 
"tent government") in the thirteenth century and lasting throughout 
the Tokugawa bakufu in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ja-
pan established an effective and efficient administrative state with well-
developed institutional structures and a sophisticated bureaucratic 
government. 
The second paradigm is that of the adjudicatory state, or judicial 
governance, which began with institutions developed to resolve dis-
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putes, particularly among warrior-vassals, and developed into a means 
by which the Kamakura bakufu and later Shogunates ruled (pp. 33-
49). During the feudal period, the "idea of the supremacy of law as 
command had begun to take hold," and "[a]dherence to codified pre-
scriptions and procedures of the past and basic elements of procedural 
fairness had become integral to legitimate rule" (p. 49). Codified pro-
cedural rules distinguished between adjudication initiated by petition 
and persecutions brought by authorities. Thus, civil actions as op-
posed to criminal actions were recognized for the first time. 
With the development of an adjudicatory mechanism, Japanese 
law and legal institutions began to take on a Western look. Japan's 
experience resembled that of other Western European nations where 
adjudicatory institutions developed after the collapse of a centralized 
political power - in the Western context, the Roman Empire, in the 
case of Japan, imperial rule from Kyoto. In Europe, these institutions 
developed within the Roman law tradition, in which legal systems rec-
ognized private civil law. In Japan, well-established adjudicatory in-
stitutions with progressive case law and developed procedures grew in 
the field of private law, resembling the growth of common law in Eng-
land. However, the government generally discouraged ordinary citi-
zens from using law to resolve disputes, and private disputes were 
largely left to be resolved by members of the village communities. 
The third paradigm is that of the mura: a quasi-independent and 
quasi-autonomous village (pp. 51-65). The mura, a product of the late 
sixteenth century, was an exclusive community of peasants. It func-
tioned as a self-contained economic and administrative unit. Village 
officers were named and became responsible for managing their vil-
lages, and the headman was accountable to the ruling authorities for 
any misdeed by village members. Villagers were subject to registra-
tion, tax, public work-labor obligations, and other regulatory controls 
designed to maximize revenue yields and restrict social and geographic 
mobility. In reality, however, villages retained a remarkable degree of 
autonomy in the face of pervasive regulations and controls by the cen-
tral authorities. 
So long as peace prevailed and taxes were paid, there was little to draw 
official attention and scrutiny .... By suppressing intra-community quar-
rels and satisfying formal fiscal obligations, a village community could 
restrain or avoid unwanted official regulation. The consequence was an 
institutional structure that in allowing evasion of official legal controls 
also promoted external deference and internal cohesion. In effect the 
village had the security of the administrative state along with the free-
dom of the outlaw. [p. 61] 
The desire and need to maintain mechanisms of self-governance 
for social control is substantial when the goal is to maintain indepen-
dence from a central authority that exercises coercive power. The vil-
lage community developed its own mechanisms of control, including 
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the psychological sanction of collective displeasure, ostracism, and ex-
pulsion. Community sanctions became real deterrents to wrongdoing 
in Tokugawa Japan. This community control over sanctions "also 
meant that the community had a significant degree of control over the 
viability of legal norms .... Only the rules and standards the commu-
nity was willing to enforce by the threat or application of sanctions 
could be effectively implemented within its confines" (p. 62). 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the mura paradigm was firmly es-
tablished with its effective mechanisms of informal control to maintain 
order within the village and to guard against the intrusion of the for-
mal legal sanctions exercised by the administrative state and judicial 
institutions. 
At this point, Japan experienced its second reception of foreign law 
- European law. The consequence of the Meiji legal reform is of spe-
cial importance because the Napoleonic code and the German civil 
code introduced into Japan were primarily concerned with private law 
and were essentially products of liberal states in nineteenth-century 
Europe. The adaptation of the civil code created a number of reper-
cussions. First, the civil code introduced a system of rules, based on a 
very different concept of law, into Japan. The scope of law under the 
civil code was significantly broader than the Japanese were accus-
tomed to under the traditional law exercised by the administrative 
state, judicial institutions, and in the informal mura. Japan began im-
posing legal rules that regulated behaviors previously left untouched, 
or at least ignored. For example, landlord-tenant relations, never 
outside the scope of law, were regulated much more comprehensively 
under the civil code. In addition, the Meiji legal reform introduced 
law and institutions in which no dichotomy between authority and 
power existed. 
Japan then began the process of absorption and adaptation, a pro-
cess that produced some intended as well as unintended consequences. 
In general, however, the reform conflicted with traditional modes of 
social ordering. Coercive power gradually separated from the state, 
while the state retained its authority. The reach of civil law and legal 
institutions was contained by limiting ordinary citizens' use of courts 
and by utilizing traditional methods of dispute-resolution. Conse-
quently, Japan developed into a state that, by all ostensible criteria, 
has as broad an authority as any modern industrial state; conversely, 
in terms of its coercive power and the use of its authority, Japan is 
relatively weaker than most industrial states. Thus, a vacuum has 
been created where state authority extends but no coercive power 
reaches. The vacuum has been filled, in part, by a reemergence of non-
legal social controls. This revived traditional scheme relies upon ne-
cessity of consensus as the means of decisionmaking and of informal 
coercion, and on the use of law as a part of the process of reaching 
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consensus. In this process, law often appears to provide a goal as well 
as a tool to prompt people to reach a consensus. The paradigm of the 
mura is still prevalent in contemporary Japan. 
II 
I find Professor Haley's paradigms difficult to dispute. They are 
tightly packaged and designed to show that Japan maintains an effec-
tive bureaucratic government, sophisticated adjudicatory institutions 
and procedures, and various means of informal social controls that fill 
whatever void is created by law without sanctions; that official law's 
domain is narrow and contained while unofficial group-based controls 
are pervasive; and that these characteristics of Japanese law and soci-
ety are traceable to and deeply rooted in its history and traditions. 
One has little reason to disagree with the picture that emerges from 
these paradigms. This picture, needless to say, starkly contrasts with 
that painted of the United States. According to Haley's characteriza-
tions, law in Japan is narrowly contained, divorced from moral or eth-
ical standards, and bereft of enforcement power. His interpretation of 
these characteristics is generally favorable for Japan, perhaps too 
favorable for the comfort of some Japanese readers. 8 Nevertheless, I 
find it difficult either to approve or disapprove of Haley's basic charac-
terizations because his analyses are often based on cultural differences, 
for which no quantitative evidence is available. He contrasts his char-
acterizations with the United States' legal system, and such characteri-
zations are difficult to prove or disprove; those differences may depend 
on a particular field of law or problem under comparison, and may be 
a matter of degree. It may, however, be worthwhile to point out some 
examples where the author's strokes seem too heavy or overdrawn. 
A. "Crime Without Punishment" (ch. 6) 
Among major industrial states in the postwar period, Japan alone 
has shown a substantial decline in its crime rate in almost all catego-
ries. However, a relatively small number of judges, prosecutors, and 
police officers serve its criminal justice system, leading to chronic 
criminal trial delays. Professor Haley notes that the criminal process 
in Japan moves along "two parallel tracks," - a key that makes the 
system work despite its severe institutional constraints (p. 125). The 
first track involves a formal institutional process governed by the crim-
inal code and procedural rules, similar to other industrial states. 
Within this formal criminal process, however, considerable discretion 
is given to Japanese police, prosecutors, and judges. All of them exer-
8. For example, after discussing the "dark side of social controls" and "law as tatemae" in 
chapter 8, entitled "Hamlets and Hoodlums," the author concludes that "[f]or all the conflict, 
inefficiency, and dysfunction manifest in so many aspects of postwar Japanese social, political, 
and economic life, Japan maintains a remarkably just as well as stable social order." P. 191. 
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cise discretion in such a way that an extremely lenient criminal justice 
system has evolved. 9 
The fact that few offenders see the inside of a jail results from the 
informal "second track" of the Japanese criminal justice system. An 
emphasis on confession, repentance, and absolution characterizes this 
track. In addition to such standard considerations as the gravity of 
the offense, the nature and circumstances of the crime, and the age and 
prior record of the offender, the following elements may become deter-
minative in the decision whether to report, prosecute, or sentence the 
offender: "attitude of the offender in acknowledging guilt, expressing 
remorse, and compensating any victims"; and "the victims' response 
in expressing willingness to pardon" (p. 129). 
Haley argues forcefully that the Japanese second track may con-
tribute to a reduction of crime and the rehabilitation of offenders. He 
concludes that the Japanese state has, in effect, abandoned the formal 
institutional process - the most coercive of all legitimate instruments 
of state control of crime - and has transferred its power to those who 
control informal social mechanisms (p. 128). "In contemporary Japan 
these powers thus reside with the society at large and its constituent, 
lesser communities of family, firm, and friends" (p. 138). He implies 
that effectiveness and efficiency result when the state abandons the for-
mal criminal process and relies on informal social means of crime con-
trol. He clearly exaggerates his paradigms: state authority without 
power, law without sanctions, and group-based informal controls ef-
fectively filling a vacuum created by state institutional incapacity. 
A state cannot maintain a legal order without the effective working 
of formal criminal processes. In Japan, the rate of arresting crime sus-
pects remains high, "[p]revailing conviction rates [of those charged] 
hover at about 99.5%" (p. 128), and punishments meted out by courts 
are fairly standard for each crime category. A formal criminal law 
effectively controls crimes and maintains social order. Informal social 
controls work within the clearly defined and established legal system. 
These mechanisms work because of, not in spite of, the existence of the 
state's adequate enforcement power. Haley's analysis of the second 
track remains persuasive only insofar as it describes a supplementary 
role of the second track for the primary track. 
B. ''Administrative Power Constrained" (ch. 7) 
Professor Haley examines what he finds a distinguishing character-
9. Large numbers of offenders identified by the police are never reported as suspects to 
the procuracy. Of those reported, most are convictable. Yet the vast majority are allowed 
to take advantage of summary proceedings that result in minor fines equivalent to a few 
hundred dollars. For many others prosecution is routinely suspended. Even though prose· 
cution of those that remain seems tantamount to conviction in ordinary trials, sentences are 
generally suspended in more than half of all cases. 
P. 129. 
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istic of the Japanese legal system: the Japanese bureaucracy carries 
seemingly limitless authority without even a relatively normal degree 
of coercive legal power.10 He describes the Japanese administrative 
process as a form of consensual administrative management (p. 144). 
In the context of contemporary Japan, administrative agencies must 
achieve consent among those most directly affected by administrative 
policies and whose cooperation is necessary for the effective implemen-
tation of those policies. In this process of consensus forming, the regu-
lators and the regulated negotiate in both the making and enforcement 
of policy. Those subject to governmental direction may gain a "signifi-
cant and often determinative voice in the process of formulating and 
implementing policy" (p. 144). This process, in tum, leads to the legi-
timization of the consensus-derived policy through the institutional 
empowerment of the "private" bargainer.11 Haley asserts that the 
prevalent use of administrative guidance reflects authority without 
power and fits the basic pattern of consensual governance (pp. 160-64). 
This chapter describes the distinctive character of administrative 
agencies as their lack of enforcement power. Without legal power to 
implement their policies, Japanese bureaucrats cannot act coercively. 
They remain essentially weak. This characterization contrasts with 
Professor Upham's description of administrative agencies in Law and 
Social Change in Postwar Japan, 12 which characterizes the administra-
tive agencies as active, assertive, and in the forefront of Japanese social 
change.13 Haley concentrates on economic policies, while Upham fo-
cuses on such evolving fields as environmental protection and minority 
rights. Involved government agencies may have acted without legal 
enforcement powers in each area; however, administrative agencies do 
not lack legal means to implement their policies to the degree to which 
Haley asserts. 14 In addition, agencies can actively seek the passage of 
10. "In terms of authority, governmental activity in Japan tends to be as unlimited in scope 
as in a command economy. In terms of coercive power, however, government officials have only 
the legal powers granted to them by statute plus whatever extralegal levers of influence or persua-
sion may be available." P. 144. 
11. Haley finds the basic form of consensual management at work in the Japanese govern-
ment's reliance on cartels and trade associations in prewar and postwar economic policy. Pp. 
144-53. 
12. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). For 
Haley's views on Upham's book, see John O. Haley, Book Review, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 
243 (1988). I find that the two books, despite their different approaches and focuses, complement 
each other well in presenting the Japanese legal cultural characteristics; both are essential for 
anyone interested in Japanese law and society. 
13. Professor Chalmers Johnson expressed a similar view with regard to the leading role 
played by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in evolving industrial policy in 
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982). 
14. The Administrative Substitute Execution Act of 1948 is a powerful legal tool that an 
administrative agency can rely upon when a party under a duty to perform does not satisfy its 
obligation. Gyosei dai shikko ho (Law No. 43, 1948). The agency itself can perform the duty in 
substitution or can employ a third party to perform the same duty. In either case, the agency can 
impose the cost of substitute performance on the original nonperforming party. This law is often 
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necessary and adequate legislation that enables them to implement 
their policies effectively. In the field of environmental administration, 
the Pollution Control Costs Allocation Act15 and the Pollution-Vic-
tims Compensation Act16 exemplify this power. In both instances, ad-
ministrative agencies of the central as well as local governments 
assume active roles, backed by legal enforcement power, in assessing 
pollution control and remedial costs and imposing these costs on 
polluters. 
Haley states that "Japan's dependency on consensus can be argued 
to have acquired from habit and expectation a particular and self-rein-
forcing legitimacy. In this context, formal law-making and law-en-
forcing processes ... function in large measure as consensus-building 
processes rather than avenues for command and coercion" (p. 198). I 
find it difficult to disagree with this general cultural explanation. Nev-
ertheless, I find the statement ambiguous as to how cultural elements 
matter at the level of individual decisionmaking and behavior. Haley 
contends that "the Japanese may be more tolerant of informal enforce-
ment than Americans ... because of shared attitudes or simply habit" 
(p. 165). He states that such cultural factors matter in situations 
where 
the official or the private party or both would have acted differently out 
of self-interest but for a cultural imperative. Only if, for instance, the 
respondent of an official request complies even though doing so runs 
counter to economic or other gain could an attitude of submission and 
deference to authority be viewed as determinative. [p. 165] 
I am unpersuaded, and troubled, by this statement's implication that a 
cultural imperative may work against the self-interest of parties in-
volved. Haley makes a similar statement on determinative cultural 
factors in Chapter Five, to which I will return later. 
C. ''Lawsuits and Lawyers: The Making of a Myth" (ch. 5) 
Haley argues that the Japanese have historically been quite litig-
ious. He is indeed one of the first scholars to question the myth of 
Japanese nonlitigiousness.17 Contrary to Haley's implied projections, 
however, litigation rates in contemporary Japan continue to decrease 
used in the field of environmental cleanup. Before World War II, administrative agencies could 
impose administrative fines and exercise direct power, including detention and confinement, 
under the Administrative Enforcement Act (Gyosei shikko ho, Law No. 84, 1900). However, 
those powers were subsequently taken away. 
15. Kogai boshi jigyohi jigyosha futan ho (Law No. 133, 1970). 
16. Kogai kenko higai no hosho ni kansuru horitsu (Law No. 97, 1987), which in 1988 
renamed and subsequently amended the original act, Kogai kenko higai hosho ho (Law No. 111, 
1973). 
17. John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAP. STUD. 359 (1978). The 
debate continues in J. Mark Ramseyer, Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in 
Japan, 14 J. JAP. STUD. 111 (1988); Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: 
Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989). 
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rather than increase (p. 97). Haley is in a position to explain a curious 
paradox: the Japanese like to sue, but, in fact, they do not sue, or they 
are becoming less likely to do so. 
Haley explains that the Japanese do not litigate because litigation 
does not pay. He attributes this trend to three policy and institutional 
factors: (1) the government discouraged litigation and encouraged 
mediation, especially in the interwar years; (2) the lack of a jury sys-
tem and the career judiciary foster a greater uniformity and certainty 
of result; and (3) the official registry systems for real property and 
family relationships preclude the need to use the courts in a wide vari-
ety of cases, including adoption, divorce, real property transfers, and 
succession (pp. 114-16). In addition, he relies on two cultural factors: 
mediation - the availability of third parties who can perform the role 
of mediator reduces the need to invoke formal judicial intervention -
and interdependency - the extent of close interdependency relation-
ships from family ties to business dealings precludes resort to the 
courts (pp. 115-16). 
Haley criticizes the popular image produced by "impressionistic 
anthropology" that views the Japanese reluctance to litigate as a par-
ticular phenomenon of a culture that emphasizes social harmony and 
cohesion (pp. 114-15). Nevertheless, he feels he must add the above 
cultural factors to the institutional ones. He states that people go to 
court when they perceive that the "prospective outcome of a litigated 
case is more beneficial than other avenues of redress" (p. 116). In 
other words, people litigate when they have something to gain. How-
ever, Haley does not fully explain or justify the decision not to sue 
when a litigant has something to gain ... 
The individual decision not to sue involves essentially two scena-
rios: one does not litigate when it does not pay or one does not litigate 
even when it does pay. The former is a rational choice and needs no 
cultural explanation; the decision could be explained by some or all of 
the various institutional constraints that Haley mentions. The latter 
case, where one does not litigate even if one may benefit from doing so, 
seems nonrational or irrational and calls for some explanation, cul-
tural or otherwise. I cannot accept that the latter case of irrational 
choice exists as a cultural pattern, and without an explanation of such 
behavior, Haley's reliance on culture to justify irrationality is 
unconvincing. 
Haley argues that the "use of apology and other customary prac-
tices" may preclude "the enforcement of otherwise applicable legal 
rules" (pp. 117-18). He cites, as an example, past acceptance by Japa-
nese women of unequal treatment despite constitutional and statutory 
proscriptions regarding gender discrimination (p. 118). In this irra-
tional choice case, "apology and other customary practices" seem in-
adequate and unsatisfactory to explain the decision not to sue, 
1540 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1529 
especially because this explanation disregards existing institutional 
constraints that clearly deter a woman from seeking legal redress in 
such a situation. is 
III 
Professors Hamilton and Sanders base their book, Everyday Jus-
tice: Responsibility and the Individual in Japan and the United 
States, 19 on a comparative and empirical study about responsibility 
and sanctions, which the authors regard as core aspects of legal cul-
ture. The book asserts that "it is a fundamental human impulse to 
seek restitution or retribution when a wrong is done, yet individuals 
and societies assess responsibility and allocate punishment for wrong-
doing in different ways" (book jacket). 
Based on the data collected from surveys conducted in Detroit, 
Michigan and Yokohama and Kanazawa, Japan, the authors compare 
both individual and cultural reactions to wrongdoing. They find deci-
sions about justice are influenced by whether or not a social relation 
exists between the offender and victim; Americans tend to see actors in 
isolation, while Japanese tend to see them in relation to each other. 
The Japanese, mindful of role obligations and social ties, relate punish-
ment to the goal of restoring the offender to the social network. In 
contrast, Americans punish wrongdoers by isolating them from the 
community. The authors suggest two models, "justice among friends" 
versus "justice toward strangers," as approaches to analyzing the 
processes of ascribing responsibility for wrongdoing and judging ap-
propriate sanctions in modern society. 20 
Though Hamilton and Sanders' research focuses primarily on so-
cial psychology, the book informs and illuminates anyone interested in 
studying comparative legal culture. Its findings and analysis generally 
support some of Haley's assertions while refuting others. Specifically, 
Hamilton and Sanders view Japanese nonlitigiousness from a different 
perspective and offer more persuasive explanations. 
The authors observe that, in comparing Japanese and American 
societies, scholars have persistently debated the relative importance of 
18. Some institutional and legal constraints under which women sued for employment dis· 
crimination are explored in Catherine W. Brown, Japanese Approaches to Equal Rights for Wo· 
men: The Legal Framework, 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 29 (1979). The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Danjo koyo kikai kinto ho, Law No. 113) was substan· 
tially amended in 1985 (Law No. 45). 
19. V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (1992). The book certainly merits a full 
and detailed review by some competent specialist. I merely summarize some of its points rele· 
vant to Haley's book. The results of surveys in Japanese cities have been published in Japanese. 
ZENSUKE !SHIMURA ET AL., SEKININ TO TSUMI No ISHIKI Kozo (1986). The Japanese data 
and findings are much more interesting and meaningful when compared and analyzed in this 
book with the counterpart data from the United States. 
20. HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 19, at 203. 
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cultural and structural explanations for observed differences. The de-
bate, the authors believe, has too narrowly centered on the issue of 
litigiousness, focusing on litigation rates as evidence of cultural val-
ues. 21 They find this debate, in which Haley has been one of the major 
contenders, confusing and misleading because it has failed to specify 
the particular decision under discussion. Disputants make many deci-
sions while they move on to different levels in the "disputing pyra-
mid. "22 Haley argues that a nonlitigious ethic is useful in explaining 
Japanese legal behavior only if the disputants reach settlements that 
do not reflect the expected value of a case. As Hamilton and Sanders 
point out, Haley seems to argue that, if culture matters, litigants 
should settle for less, and implies that cultural explanations of nonli-
tigiousness predict economically irrational behavior.23 
Hamilton and Sanders view the issue of litigiousness as one that 
distorts the relations between legal culture and legal structure. They 
point out that the debate has tended to equate cultural explanations 
with microprocesses and structural explanations with macroprocesses, 
looking at cultural values within the narrow context of an individual's 
decision whether to sue while looking at the court structure as the 
environment within which that decision is made. The authors argue 
that "this is an error because it misconstrues the role of legal culture in 
shaping a legal system."24 
According to the authors, the debate focusing on litigation rates 
has produced some questionable assertions: the Japanese legal system 
is fragile because it is under attack from those who want to litigate, 
and it is less than legitimate because the Japanese government elites 
have managed the legal system to discourage litigation in order to con-
trol the populace. 
Hamilton and Sanders, basing their explanations on the survey 
data, provide a different perspective and suggest another possible ex-
planation, which I find more persuasive. According to them, the Japa-
nese express support for a less adversarial process and are more willing 
to forgo litigation, in order to create a collective benefit, an atmos-
phere of harmony and compromise. In such a society, the authors 
argue, those who insist on their legal rights may be seen as free riders, 
exploiting the collective benefit, and modern legal reforms in Japan 
21. Id. at 188-90. 
22. "The disputing pyramid is a metaphor to describe the process by which a large number of 
injuries or other unfortunate outcomes become thought of as acts of wrongdoing, are trans-
formed into claims, are pursued through legal or nonlegal channels. Some injuries generate no 
claims, some claims are dropped or not otherwise pursued, some are settled before suit, some 
suits are settled or dropped before trial, and some decisions are not appealed; the pyramid meta-
phor reflects the fact that the number of cases constantly decreases as claims move up through 
the system." Id. at 191. 
23. Id. at 189. 
24. Id. at 192. 
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can be interpreted as a "process of constant adjustments to thwart the 
corrosive impact of litigious free riders on a nonlitigious legal 
order."25 
The authors suggest that Japanese society may choose to focus on 
citizens' preferences when they are concerned with community values 
(e.g., harmony, peace) rather than when they are concerned with indi-
vidual problems. They state that, by doing so, Japanese society is not 
basing its choices on less valid or less legitimate components of legal 
culture; rather, the Japanese legal order legitimately attends to citi-
zens' preferences by reflecting the concerns of a contextual self rather 
than the concerns of an individual self. 26 I find Hamilton and Sanders' 
explanation more pertinent to the issue of litigiousness than Haley's 
cultural factors. 
In conclusion, the authors suggest two visions of responsibility and 
justice, one among friends and the other among strangers, "each 
originating in the nature and boundaries of everyday social relation-
ships between people. "27 They find that Americans dispense more jus-
tice toward strangers, while the Japanese rely more on justice among 
friends. However, their data also show that "Japanese judge strangers 
much as Americans do, and would punish strangers at least as 
harshly; Japanese simply seem to deal with fewer strangers in their 
daily routine."28 A simple statement like this one, supported by sur-
vey data, adequately explains apparent cultural characteristics and in-
clines toward a more productive comparison of substantive problems 
and laws between the United States and Japan. 
IV 
Two strong trends in contemporary Japan should challenge Profes-
sor Haley's mura paradigm. These are urbanization and 
internationalization. 
Increasing urbanization in Japan has already destroyed many so-
cial relationships that existed in the traditional mura model.29 In ur-
ban settings, people are more isolated and alienated. They tend to seek 
more justice among strangers than among friends. Informal social 
controls become less effective because the web of personal relation-
25. Id. at 193. 
26. Id. at 195. 
27. Id. at 216. 
28. Id. at 217. 
29. For example, see THEODORE c. BESTOR, NEIGHBORHOOD TOKYO (1989), which de-
scribes urban neighborhoods in contemporary Japan and effectively challenges assumptions such 
as Tokyo as a congeries of villages, displaying direct historical continuity with preindustrial vil-
lage life, and as urban neighborhoods that are little more than administrative or political units. 
One should note, however, that the Miyamoto-cha described in the book is a distinctive commu-
nity quite different from massively developed urban "new" towns and "residential cities" that 
dominate Tokyo. 
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ships that once existed is rapidly disintegrating. Business firms and 
workplace groups cannot substitute for the tightly knit personal rela-
tions of the mura. After all, these modem organizations have more 
definite purposes, such as profit seeking, that require different forms of 
commitment from, and place different obligations on, their members. 
Consensus for the good of the community becomes much more diffi-
cult to achieve. 
Internationalization has also impacted Japan, challenging it to be-
come a more open and transparent society. Increasingly, international 
transactions force Japan to face incorporation of diverse foreign ele-
ments into the society: international firms, foreign lawyers, and work-
ers. The negative side of consensus governance has thus become 
apparent. Consensus governing has worked and is efficient simply be-
cause, once it is formed, participating parties are bound to honor the 
consensus result, and no formal enforcement costs are needed to im-
plement agreed upon policy. The fewer the participants, the easier to 
obtain consensus. Consensus governing is effective because its process 
excludes many parties whose interests are affected once consensus is 
formed. Unfairness of consensual administration to those who do not 
have access to the decisionmaking process is apparent, and the costs of 
correcting unfairness have become great. 30 These developments 
should affect and change legal structural arrangements as well as cul-
turally oriented behaviors based on the traditional mura model. 
Some years ago, I spoke to a group of American lawyers attending 
a Japan-U.S. conference on legal and economic relations.31 After 
describing the Japanese legal system in terms of several features that 
do not exist in Japan but are often taken for granted by American 
lawyers (jury system, contempt of court, a wide range of equitable 
remedies, pretrial discovery, punitive damages, class actions, and con-
tingent fees, and so forth), one American lawyer stood up and de-
manded, "How can you do justice in a legal system like that?" 
The Japanese legal system is certainly trying to achieve justice 
without some of the American legal fixtures. Oftentimes, it is indeed 
difficult to explain how we accomplish this, let alone to convince the 
American lawyers that a legal system without those basic features 
could work and be accepted as fair and legitimate. 
Haley certainly provides both an answer to the above question and 
a way to look at Japanese law and society. His basic message is that 
30. Misusing coercive legal means in this context may sometimes incur disproportionate so-
cial costs. A glaring example of this is the construction of the Narita International Airport, 
which remains incomplete after 20 years because of organized protest and resistance by land-
owner-farmers. This example may support Haley's point that consensus forming is important for 
administrative agencies before implementing certain policies. See DA vm E. APTER AND 
NAGAYO SAWA, AGAINST THE STATE: PoLmcs AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN JAPAN (1984). 
31. The conference met in Tokyo in 1988. Papers presented at the conference were published 
in UNITED STATES/JAPAN CoMMERCIAL LAW & TRADE (V. Kusuda-Smick ed., 1990). 
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there are other ways of administering justice different from those ac-
cepted in the United States. His paradigms, rooted in the historical 
past and traditions of Japan, have produced a persuasive overall image 
of law in a consensus-based society. Nevertheless, his paradigms may 
be faulted for attributing too much to culture, which is also subject to 
change, and for making his overall presentation of Japanese law and 
society too distinctive. Overemphasizing Japan's distinctiveness in-
curs a risk ofreviving old myths about Japan that Haley effectively has 
begun to break down, myths based on an assumption that Japan is 
culturally unique. 
I do not deny the usefulness and effectiveness of using cultural ex-
planations, especially when one is presenting an overall view of a for-
eign legal system. I would adopt a very similar approach as Haley's if 
I were describing the American legal system. However, I find Haley's 
heavy emphasis on the distinctiveness of Japanese law and society to 
be a little dangerous. Also, I suspect that Haley's emphasis on some 
positive and favorable aspects of Japanese law and society may just be 
a reflection of his critical view of, and dissatisfaction with, the contem-
porary American legal system. Or, am I reading too much into or out 
of this book? 
Professor Haley has written one of the most provocative books on 
Japanese law and society. The book challenges other comparative 
legal scholars to test, refute, amend, and change the author's general 
paradigms in each substantive law field as well as to engage in overall 
studies of Japanese legal culture. 
